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Abstract 
 
We investigate the interface between trade and invasive species (IS) risk, focusing on the 
existing tariff escalation in agro-forestry product markets and its implication for IS risk. Tariff 
escalation in processed agro-forestry products exacerbates the risk of IS by biasing trade flows 
toward increased trade of primary commodity flows and against processed-product trade. We 
show that reducing tariff escalation by lowering the tariff on processed goods increases 
allocative efficiency and reduces the IS externality, a win-win situation. We also identify policy 
menus for trade reforms involving tariffs on both raw input and processed goods, leading to win-
win situations. 
 
Keywords: agro-forestry products, exotic pest, international trade, invasive species, tariff 
escalation, trade flows. 
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TARIFF ESCALATION AND INVASIVE SPECIES RISK 
1. Introduction 
International trade can be an important driver of environmental change, although often 
indirectly through specialization and expansion or contraction of dirty activities (Beghin, 
Roland-Holst, and van der Mensbrugghe). In a few cases, trade is the direct vector of the 
environmental issue, as emphasized in recent literature. The literature has been focusing on 
accidental introductions of exotic or invasive species (IS) like pests, weeds, and viruses, by way 
of international transport of commodities, which is an important aspect of this complex nexus 
(Perrings, Williamson, and Dalmazzone; Mumford). The trade and environment interface is 
inherent in the economics of IS since trade is a major vector of propagation of these species. The 
current economic literature is mostly focused on the “right” criteria to use or the optimal 
environmental policy response to the hazard of IS (e.g., Binder; Sumner). A related debate 
revolves around quarantine as a legitimate policy response to phytosanitary risk (Anderson, 
McRae, and Wilson; Cook and Fraser; and Kim and Lewandrowski).  
Agricultural and forestry imports have always been an important conduit for biological 
invasions. The agricultural tariff structure, with its strong influence on trade flows, is a 
determinant of IS. Identifying the linkages between tariff structure, trade, and IS is an important 
issue for understanding the risk of IS introduction. The trade and IS literature is still limited. 
Using a Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) approach, Costello and McAusland show that 
lowering agricultural tariffs could potentially lower the damage from exotic species, even though 
the volume of trade rises. An increase in imports results in a reduced domestic agricultural 
output. Thus, the output available for IS damage is reduced and so is the amount of contaminated 
land, which mitigates the propagation of IS. Subsequently, McAusland and Costello compare 
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tariff (duties) and non-tariff regulations (quarantine measures, port inspections) aimed at 
monitoring IS risks linked to commodity imports. Tariffs are found to be optimal (i.e., the 
optimal trade tax is positive and increasing with the risk of invasion), while inspections are not. 
Paarlberg and Lee have also investigated the role of trade policy as a tool for monitoring risks, 
linking infection risk from imports to a tariff, so that the exporter of an infected product faces a 
higher tariff than would otherwise be the case. Margolis, Shogren, and Fischer investigate IS 
hazards and trade barriers by introducing an IS externality in a political-economy model of tariff 
formation. The tariff set by a government caring both for general welfare and for lobbyists’ 
donations is above the socially optimal level, internalizing the risk from IS. However, unless the 
damage function from IS is common knowledge, it is impossible to distinguish the protectionist 
component of the tariff.  
Our paper departs from this limited literature and fills an important knowledge gap in 
policy analysis related to trade and IS. We investigate the trade-IS interface, focusing on the 
existing tariff escalation in agricultural and food-processing markets and its impact on IS hazard 
and associated externalities. The paper addresses an overlooked but important aspect of the 
trade-IS debate. Tariff escalation occurs when tariffs increase with stages of 
transformation/processing of products into value-added products (e.g., from primary agricultural 
commodities to food-processing goods). Tariff escalation is a well-established and lasting fact in 
processing sectors using agro-forestry raw inputs (see Aksoy; Gallezot; Lindland; and Rae and 
Josling for recent evidence). Tariff escalation in processed agro-forestry products increases the 
risk of IS by biasing trade flows toward primary commodity flows and against processed-product 
trade. Even though precise data on differential risk from agricultural to processed-good imports 
are limited, the risk of pest introduction appears much higher for non-processed commodities 
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than for highly transformed products. Many nature-based, processed final goods are virtually IS 
free, whereas their raw input is a significant IS vector. For example, rice-processing practices 
such as polishing have a lethal effect on insects like rice weevils (Lucas and Riudavets). This 
suggests that the potential high risk of weevil invasions related to rice imports could be 
negligible for milled rice as compared with paddy rice imports. Similarly, invasive foreign 
insects in raw wood products such as the Asian longhorned beetle can be eliminated in final 
goods since finish milling and kiln drying will kill most wood organisms when done properly. 
 We explore the conjecture that many OECD countries could reduce or rebalance their 
trade of primary products (agricultural commodities, wood) by reducing tariffs on processed 
food and value-added wood products. The composition of their imports would change and the 
share of processed goods in imports would rise. Two welfare gains ensue. The first one is an 
allocative gain in markets. The second one refers to the reduction of IS hazard and associated 
externalities. We formalize this conjecture and establish conditions under which it arises. We 
translate these conditions into practical policy recommendations. Our specific objectives are to 
identify policy setting and reforms under which win-win situations arise (reduced trade 
distortions, reduced hazard and externalities).  
 In the following sections we discuss the evidence on tariff escalation, on IS, and on 
associated costs. Then we analytically formalize the conditions under which win-win outcomes 
arise. Finally, we provide conclusions and policy implications.  
 
2. Evidence on Tariff Escalation and IS 
2.1. Tariff escalation 
The economics literature has long established the existence of tariff escalation in the protection 
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structure of commodity and processed-product markets. Protection escalates with the level of 
processing, in almost all countries and across many products. This escalation hinders the 
exporter’s diversification into value-added and processed products. 
There is a well-established, older research track on tariff escalation from the late 1970s 
with the work of Yeats, Finger, and associates (Golub and Finger; Laird and Yeats; and Yeats). 
Tariff escalation is still an enduring feature of agricultural and food-processing trade according 
to more recent literature (Aksoy; Gibson et al.; Lindland; and Rae and Josling). It continues to be 
so despite the emergence of preferential agreements in the EU and the US (Gallezot). Rae and 
Josling find that export of processed food from developing economies has been impeded by tariff 
escalation in the industrialized countries but also within the developing countries themselves. 
These finding are based on an older dataset (GTAP 4). Aksoy and Gibson et al. find similar 
patterns with much more recent data.  
Telling examples of tariff escalation abound for a wide range of products. Current EU 
tariffs on milled rice imports into the EU are 80% compared to only 46% for brown rice 
(Wailes). Within the EU raw cocoa has a tariff of 0%. At its first processing stage (cocoa butter) 
it is charged 9%, and at its second stage (cocoa paste) it attracts 21%. The figures for coffee are 
4% for the raw product and 11% for its second processing stage, and for soybeans the figures are 
0% and 6% respectively (Aksoy). Japan and the US apply comparable tariff structures. Studies 
show that the proportion of processed products to the least developed countries’ (LDCs’) total 
agricultural produce exports dropped from 27% to 16.9% from 1964 to 1994 while that of the 
developing countries as a whole during the same period increased from 41.7% to 54.1%. This, 
however, covers mostly only first-stage processing. If a further processing stage is taken into 
account, the proportions are much lower, at 8.4% and 16.6% respectively (Aksoy; Windfuhr). 
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Wood products show similar patterns, with logs traded at zero or a very low tariff while 
processed wood products faced much higher tariffs. 
2.2. IS and associated externalities 
The introduction of harmful exotic species into non-native environments has received heightened 
recognition because of the threats this biological pollution poses to agriculture, ecosystem health, 
endangered species, economic interests, and even public health. In the US alone, scientists 
estimate that about 7,000 IS of plants, mammals, birds, amphibians, reptiles, fish, arthropods, 
and mollusks are established and cost the economy between US$120 and $138 billion a year 
(Pimentel et al., 2000 and 2005). The US Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) provides 
lower cost estimates, which mainly focus on crop damages caused by 79 species, as agriculture-
related costs represent over 90% of the OTA estimation, whereas over half of Pimentel’s 
calculation relates to agriculture. 
 For agriculture, Perrault et al. arrange the costs and impacts from IS into six broad 
categories (crop losses, rangeland value decline, water resource depletion, livestock disease, 
genetic contamination, and management and eradication costs), and estimate that 40% of all 
insect damages to crops in the US are attributable to non-indigenous species. For example, the 
rice weevil (Sitophilus Oryzae) is a significant destroyer of crop and stored-grain that originated 
in India. It attacks wheat, corn, oats, rye, barley, sorghum, buckwheat, dried beans, and cashew 
nuts. In sum, large externalities are generated when IS are introduced to a new environment. 
Aggregate IS risk and externalities are conditioned by the existing trade distortion structure. The 
current trade distortion structure exacerbates this risk and the costs by favoring imports with 
higher IS risk. A reduction in trade distortions will affect the IS risk level and the environmental 
policy response to address this risk, be it through exclusion or through eradication efforts. The 
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appendix provides further details on IS associated with rice and wood products and associated 
tariff escalation. 
 
3. The Model 
We use a simple multimarket partial-equilibrium model combining input and output markets in a 
small, open economy distorted by tariffs in both markets and by an externality in the input 
market. The latter is induced by IS associated with imports.  
3.1. Modeling tariff escalation 
Suppose that domestic final good DFG is produced from inputs D and I with a Cobb-Douglas 
technology, where D and I are perfect substitutes for raw inputs and fixed factor K . We denote 
DI=D+I, the total use of raw input. The production function for the domestic final good is 
1DFG DI Kθ θ−=  with ( )0,1θ ∈ . 
Profit maximization leads to the derived input demand and supply of DFG as follows: 
1
1
d DI
DFG
PDI K
P
θ
θ
−⎛ ⎞
= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
, and 
1
s DI
DFG
PDFG K
P
θ
θ
θ
−⎞⎛
= ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
, 
where DIP  is the input price and DFGP  is price of DFG.  
Turning to demand, the demand for the processed good comes from the consumer of the 
processed final products, FG. Domestic and imported processed goods, DFG and IFG, are 
assumed perfect substitutes for the consumer. For simplicity’s sake we assume quasilinear 
preferences for the processed goods. The utility of the consumer is a function of these two goods 
and an aggregate of all other goods, AOG. This is expressed as U(DFG+IFG, OAG) with  
1
( , )
1
U FG AOG AOG FG
γ
γγ
γ
−
= +
−
 where 0γ > , and FG DFG IFG= + . 
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Utility maximization subject to a budget constraint, with AOG as numeraire, leads to the 
demand for processed goods as FGFG P
γ−
=  or the inverse demand 1/FGP FG
γ−
= . 
Suppose imported input I is subject to an ad valorem tariff It , that is, (1 )I I IP WP t= + ,  
and imported processed good IFG is subject to an ad valorem tariff IFGt , leading to 
(1 )IFG IFG IFGP WP t= + . Suppose that, initially, tariff escalation is in place, i.e., It < IFGt . By 
normalizing world prices equal to 1 without any loss of generality and using tariff factors 
denoted by τ we have (1 )I I IP tτ= = +  and (1 )IFG IFG IFGP tτ= = + . 
3.2. IS associated with imported input 
Suppose input D is produced with an increasing marginal cost. Suppose that the frequency of IS 
occurrence associated with imported input is Iz  per unit, and imported output does not bring any 
risk. Consistent with many cases of IS, suppose the effects of Iz on the economy translate into an 
increase in the cost of production of the domestic input D. The total cost function is written as  
20.5DTC FC D Dα β= + + , 
where Iz Iβ =  reflects the IS externality and the cost of eradication associated with imports. The 
marginal cost is 
DMC Dα β= + . 
Profit-maximizing behavior of D producer leads to marginal cost pricing behavior, which defines 
the supply of input D: 
DP Dα β= + . 
Since DFG and IFG are homogenous commodities, in equilibrium, they face the same price in 
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the domestic market:1  
(1 )DFG IFG FG IFG IFG IFGP P P WP t τ= = = + = , 
and the same for D and I: 
(1 )D I DI I I IP P P WP t τ= = = + = . 
Initial equilibrium with tariff escalation 
Denoting (*) for the equilibrium level, after some simple calculation, we get 
* IFGFG
γτ −= ,  (1) 
1
* I
IFG
DFG K
θ
θτ
θτ
−⎡ ⎤
= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
,  (2) 
1
* IIFG
IFG
IFG K
θ
θ
γ ττ
θτ
−
−
⎡ ⎤
= − ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, and  (3)  
1
1
* I
IFG
DI K
θτ
θτ
−⎡ ⎤
= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
.  (4) 
Since ( 1)* *D I IP D z I
ατ α −= = + , and D*+I*=DI*, we solve for D* and I*: 
1
1
* I I I
I I IFG
z KD
z z
θτ τ
α α θτ
−⎡ ⎤
= − ⎢ ⎥
− − ⎣ ⎦
, and  (5) 
1
1
* I I
I IFG I
KI
z z
θτ τα
α θτ α
−⎡ ⎤
= −⎢ ⎥
− −⎣ ⎦
.  (6) 
Parameter Iz  is assumed to be small enough so that Izα > . This leads to the following condition 
for both domestic and imported input to be positive: 
* *I Iz DI P DIα< < , or [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
1 1
1 1 1 11I IFG I IFG Iz K K
θ θ
θ θ θ θθτ τ α θτ τ− − − −< < . (7) 
                                                        
1
 We assume that these tariffs are not prohibitive; i.e., imports take place at equilibrium. 
9 
Total welfare of the economy includes the following components: the consumer surplus 
associated with FG consumption, the surplus from the derived demand of DI captured in the  
producer surplus associated with the supply of DFG, the producer surplus associated with the 
supply of D, and the tax revenues generated by the imposition of IFGτ  and Iτ . 
Reducing tariff escalation via a final-good tariff decrease 
We now reduce the tariff escalation by reducing the tariff (and the associated factor) on the 
processed final good, IFGt , to 
N
IFGt < IFGt  ( NIFGτ  < IFGτ ) and keeping It  (or τI) constant. The new 
equilibrium, denoted by the double asterisk (**), is 
**
IFG
NFG γτ −= ,  (8) 
1
** IN
IFG
DFG K
θ
θτ
θτ
−⎡ ⎤
= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
,  (9) 
1
**
IFG
IFG
N I
NIFG K
θ
θ
γ ττ
θτ
−
−
⎡ ⎤
= − ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, (10) 
1
1
** IN
IFG
DI K
θτ
θτ
−⎡ ⎤
= ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
,  (11) 
1
1
** I I IN
I I IFG
z KD
z z
θτ τ
α α θτ
−⎡ ⎤
= − ⎢ ⎥
− − ⎣ ⎦
, and  (12) 
1
1
** I IN
I IFG I
KI
z z
θτ τα
α θτ α
−⎡ ⎤
= −⎢ ⎥
− −⎣ ⎦
.  (13) 
By using 1, 0, NIFG IFGθ γ τ τ< > <  and comparing directly the equilibrium levels before and 
after reforms, we get the following lemma. 
Lemma 1: Under assumptions of sections 3.1 and 3.2., a reduction in tariff escalation through a 
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decrease in the tariff on the imported processed good and holding the tariff on imported raw 
input constant has the following impacts:  
(i) total final good consumed increases, domestic final good consumed decreases, and imported 
final good consumed increases;  
(ii) total raw input used decreases, domestic input used increases, and imported input used 
decreases. 
Lemma 1 is illustrated in figure 1. The policy shock is shown in figure 1a, which induces an 
immediate shift of the derived demand DI to the left in figure 1b, a resulting decrease in imports 
of the input, and, after stabilization, a decrease in the associated externality and eradication cost. 
The latter induces a shift of the domestic supply of the input D to the right.  
 To compare total welfare before and after reforms, we decompose welfare in terms of 
elements in final-good and input markets. First, welfare in the final-good market, the sum of 
consumer surplus, producer surplus, and tariff revenue, increases as the tariff on the final good 
falls and the two triangles of deadweight loss shrink. Next, in the input market, the triangle of 
deadweight loss associated with the domestic input supply D remains unchanged because of its 
linear specification and the parallel shift from the reduced externality. Note also that the changes 
in surplus from the derived demand DI and input tax revenues from Iτ are captured in changes in 
profit measured in the variation of the producer surplus in the supply DFG. Hence, two less 
obvious components of the welfare consequences of the lower tariff are the input producer 
surplus in D inclusive of the externality and the deadweight loss associated with the derived 
demand of DI. These two welfare components before reform are described as follows: 
*
* * *
0 1
* * ( ) ( ) *Id
D d
DI I DDI
W PS DWL D P D dD DI d DI
τ
τ τ τ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= − = − − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∫ ∫  
where *DP  is the supply of D when risks are associated with equilibrium import level 
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*( ) *D IP D D z Iα= + , and 
1
1
( , )d IFG
IFG
DI K
θτ
τ τ
θτ
−⎛ ⎞
= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
. For this cost specification, welfare in the 
input market is 
*
1
0.5 * * ( , ) *I dDI I I IFGW D z I DI d DI
τ
τ τ τ τ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= − − −⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫  
= ( )1/(1 ) /( 1) 1/( 1)1 10.5 * *I I IFG I ID z I K θ θ θ θθτ θτ τ τθ θ
−
− −
−⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤
− − − +⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ .  (14) 
These two welfare components in the input market after reforms are 
**
1
0.5 ** ** ( , ) **I
IFG
d N
DI I IW D z I DI d DI
τ
τ τ τ τ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= − − −⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫  
= ( )1/(1 ) /( 1) 1/( 1)1 10.5 ** ** IFGNI I I ID z I K θ θ θ θθτ θτ τ τθ θ
−
− −
−⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤
− − − +⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ .  (15) 
Proposition 1: Under assumptions of sections 3.1. and 3.2., a reduction in tariff escalation 
through a decrease in the tariff on imported processed goods and holding the tariff on imported 
raw input constant increases total welfare by increasing allocative efficiency and reducing IS 
risk and externality. 
Proof: Comparing producer surplus in the input market before and after reforms, we have 
** *PS PS>  since by lemma 1, ** *D D>  and ** *I I< . Comparing deadweight loss 
associated with the derived demand for DI since 
IFG IFG
Nτ τ<  and 1θ <  we find that 
** *
d dDI DI
DWL DWL< . We also know that welfare in the final-good market, which is the sum of 
consumer surplus, producer surplus, and tariff revenue, increases as the tariff on the final good 
falls. Therefore, total welfare, the sum of welfare in final-good and input markets, increases after 
reforms. Market efficiency improves and the IS externality decreases because of the reduction in 
imports of raw inputs I.▄  
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Some interesting situations lead to special cases of proposition 1. The results stated in 
proposition 1 hold when the tariff on the imported final good is lowered to any level below its 
initial level, hence, when it is equal to the tariff on imported raw inputs or when it is removed. 
Corollary 1: Under assumptions of sections 3.1.and 3.2., starting from initial tariff escalation,  
(i) removing the tariff on the final good increases welfare and reduces IS risk. 
(ii) a uniform tariff structure that equates tariff on processed good to tariff on raw input 
increases welfare and reduces IS risk. 
 Finally, we note the special case of a zero tariff on the raw input in the presence of tariff 
escalation. In the latter case, moving to free trade in all markets is welfare improving and reduces 
the externality from IS. 
Reducing tariff escalation by joint tariff reduction 
We now consider a second policy menu reducing the escalation by reducing both tariffs or 
equivalently both factors from Iτ , IFGτ  to NNIτ and NNIFGτ , respectively, such that 
NN
IFG IFG
NN
I I
τ τ
<τ τ . This 
implies that the final-processed tariff is reduced faster than is the raw-input tariff. Figure 2 
illustrates the joint tariff reduction case with two policy shocks; i.e., both tariff factors fall. The 
processor’s supply DFGs shifts moderately to the right as the input becomes cheaper. Her/his 
derived demand DId shifts much to the left as output price falls significantly with the reduction in 
escalation. Supply Ds shifts to the right as the externality decreases when input imports decrease. 
 This type of joint reduction menu is consistent with the spirit of tariff reforms the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) has put in place with the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
(WTO 1994). The Doha agreement is also likely to continue this approach (WTO 2004). All 
tariffs will eventually fall but the highest tariffs will fall faster than the moderate ones. This 
approach raises some issues: How fast should the tariff on the processed final good fall relative 
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to the fall of the tariff on the raw input, and what supply and demand conditions would ensure 
that such a reduction of escalation through joint tariff reduction would increase welfare without 
exacerbating the externality in the raw input market? 
 To derive sufficient conditions for welfare-improving joint tariff reduction, we consider 
change in deadweight loss before and after reforms and then the IS externality. There are three 
components of deadweight loss in the model: the deadweight loss associated with D supply, the 
deadweight loss associated with DI demand (or DFG supply), and the deadweight loss associated 
with FG demand. Since D and FG depend on one policy only, deadweight loss associated with 
either D or FG decreases when their respective tariff factors fall. The deadweight loss associated 
with DI (or equivalently DFG by integrability) could produce a second-best situation in which a 
reduction in one tariff could exacerbate the distortion created by the other. Focusing on DI, 
denote the relative tariff factor IFG
I
τ
τ
τ
≡  and measure deadweight loss, DWL, associated with DI 
in terms of the relative factorτ ; we then have  
1 1 2 1 2 2 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1( 1) ( 1)
2 2 2
DWL x dx
θ θ θ
τ
θ θ θ θ θ θ θθ θτ τ τ τ τ τ τ
θ θ θ
− − −
− − − − − − −
− −
= − − = − − − = + −
− − −
∫ . 
Therefore, 
1
11 (1 1/ ) 0
1
DWL θτ τ
τ θ
−
∂
= − >
∂ −
. 
Hence, any menu that decreases both policies so that the relative τ  falls (toward 1) is welfare 
improving in terms of allocative efficiency and abstracting from the eternality.2,3  
 The last component of concern is the externality. The reduction in the final-good tariff 
( NNIFGτ < IFGτ ) works its way as in proposition 1 and reduces the externality. However, the 
                                                        
2
 A similar argument can be developed for the DWL associated with the supply DFG, which is also increasing in τ.  
3
 This argument also holds for the single tariff reduction case considered previously. 
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reduction of the raw-input tariff ( NNIτ < Iτ ) increases raw-product imports and hence increases 
the IS risk and associated external cost β. Establishing sufficient conditions for a reduction in IS 
under joint tariff reform hinges upon having two offsetting effects on raw imports I, such that the 
IS externality is not exacerbated. There are a number of ways to do this. A sufficient condition is 
that the decrease in raw-input imports from the lower derived demand for DI caused by the lower 
NN
IFGτ  should at least offset the increase in raw-input imports caused by the lower NNIτ . This 
condition ensures that the marginal externality β does not increase with the joint reform or that 
0I IFG
I IFG
d dβ βτ τ
τ τ
∂ ∂
+ ≤
∂ ∂
. Next, we formalize these sufficient conditions linking tariff 
reductions and the marginal externality so that a win-win outcome arises. Noting that 
dDI =(DI / (1-θ))( dln τIFG - dln τI )]   
and that  
dD = ( τI /α )dln τI ,  
we have 
dI = (DI / (1-θ))( dln τIFG - dln τI )] - ( τI /α )dln τI ,   
which leads to the condition4  
(DI / (1-θ))( dln τIFG - dln τI )] - ( τI /α )dln τI  < 0, 
which after simplification leads to  
ln (1 )1
ln
IFG I
I
d
d DI
τ θ τ
τ
−
> + .  (16) 
                                                        
4
 In elasticity terms the condition is 
ln 1
ln
D
FG
D D PIFG
I DI P
sd
d
ετ
τ η
> +  , noting that
FG DDI P DI P
η η= − , /Ds D DI= , and 
ln 1
ln
D D
FG
D D P DI PIFG
I DI P
sd
d
ε ητ
τ η
−
> + . 
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A subset of the joint tariff reforms decreasing deadweight loss does not exacerbate the 
externality, for which the relative tariff factor falls “strongly” enough. We formalize this result in 
the following proposition.  
Proposition 2. Under assumptions of sections 3.1. and 3.2., starting from an initial tariff 
escalation, reducing tariff escalation with a joint tariff reduction increases welfare and reduces 
IS risk i.f.f. the joint reduction satisfy the following condition: 
ln (1 )1
ln
IFG I
I
d
d DI
τ θ τ
τ
−
> + . 
The intuition of the condition is straightforward. The larger the elasticity of the derived 
demand DI is with respect to the processed output price, the larger is the decrease in DI and raw 
imports I in response to a decrease of the final-good tariff factor τIFG. The smaller the raw input 
supply response is or the own-price elasticity of derived demand is in absolute value, the smaller 
is the price response of import demand in absolute value, and the smaller is the export expansion 
as a result of the lower tariff factor τI . Given the assumptions we made on the supply of the raw 
input and the technology of the processed good, it is easy to show that if the final good tariff 
factor falls twice as fast as the raw-input tariff factor then the condition is satisfied.5 
3.3. Extensions  
IS associated with both imported input and imported processed good  
Suppose that the frequency of occurrence associated with the imported processed good is IFGz  
per unit, assumed negligible in the previous sections. We assume that IFG Iz z<  to reflect the fact 
that input is much more likely to transfer risks into a country than are processed goods. Suppose 
the effects of Iz  and IFGz on the economy translate into an increase in the cost of production 
                                                        
51+ [ τI  (1-θ )/(αDI))] = 1+ (1- θ) (Dne/DI)*1, with Dne being the prevailing level of domestic supply D in absence of 
IS externality (β=0), the own-price elasticity of Dne= 1, and Dne/DI < 1.  
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MCD of the domestic input D as  
D D I IFGp MC D z I z IFGα= = + + . 
 First, we describe the initial equilibrium with tariff escalation. Denote this equilibrium by 
a superscript ( e ). The equilibrium levels of eFG , eDFG , eIFG , and eDI  remain the same as 
those in the initial equilibrium (*) in the situation with absence of IS risks associated with the 
imported processed good. Since e e eD I I IFGP D z I z IFGτ α= = + + , and 
e e eD I DI+ = , we solve 
for eD  and eI : 
1
1 1
e IPGI I I I
IFG
I I IFG I IFG
z z KD
z z z
θ
θ θ
γτ τ ττ
α α θτ α θτ
− −
−
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥
= − − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
− − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, and  (17) 
1
1 1
e IPGI I I
IFG
I IFG I IFG I
zKI
z z z
θ
θ θ
γτ τ τα τ
α θτ α θτ α
− −
−
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥
= + − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
− − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. 
6
  (18) 
Parameter Iz  is still assumed to be small enough such that Izα > . This leads to a condition for 
both domestic and imported input to be positive as follows: 
e e e
I I IFGz DI z IFG DIτ α< − < , 
where *eDI DI=  and *eIFG IFG=  as specified in the previous section. The latter condition 
defines some relation between tariff factors, frequency of occurrence, and cost parameters. 
As in the previous case in section 3.2, the crux of the welfare analysis lies in the input 
market, as allocative efficiency increases unambiguously in the output market. The surplus from 
the derived demand DI can be measured in terms of the DFG producer surplus by integrability 
and can be abstracted from. Hence, welfare consequences in the input market hinge on the 
                                                        
6
 We use 
e e
e I IPG I
I
z IFG z DID
z
τ
α
− −
=
−
, and
e e
e IPG I
I
DI z IFGI
z
α τ
α
+ −
=
−
. 
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producer surplus for input D and the deadweight loss associated with the DI derived demand: 
1
0.5 ( , )Ie e e e d eDI I I IFG IFGW D z I z IFG DI d DI
τ
τ τ τ τ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= − − − −⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫  
= ( )1/(1 ) /( 1) 1/( 1)1 10.5 e e eI I IFG IFG I ID z I z IFG K θ θ θ θθτ θτ τ τθ θ
−
− −
−⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤
− − − − +⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ .  (19) 
 How does the equilibrium look after the reform? We now reduce the tariff escalation by 
reducing IFGt  to 
N
IFGt  with 
N
IFGt < IFGt  and keeping It  constant. Denote the new equilibrium by a 
superscript ( ee ). The equilibrium levels of eeFG , eeDFG , eeIFG , and eeDI  remain the same as 
those in the initial equilibrium (**) in the situation with absence of IS risks associated with the 
imported processed good. 
Since ee ee eeD I I IFGP D z I z IFGτ α= = + + , and 
ee ee eeD I DI+ = , we solve for eeD  and eeI : 
1
1 1
1ee NIPGI I I I
IFG N N
I I IFG I IFG
z z KD
z z z
θ
θ θ
γτ τ ττ
α α θτ α θτ
− −
−
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥
= − − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
− − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, and  (20) 
1
1 1
1ee NIPGI I I
IFGN N
I IFG I IFG I
zKI
z z z
θ
θ θ
γτ τ τα τ
α θτ α θτ α
− −
−
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥
= + − −⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
− − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
.  (21) 
Lemma 2: Under the assumptions of sections 3.1. and 3.3., a reduction in tariff escalation 
through a decrease in the tariff on imported final good and holding the tariff on imported raw 
input constant has the following effects:  
(i) total final good consumption increases, domestic final good consumed decreases, and 
imported final good consumed increases;  
(ii) total raw input use decreases, imported input use decreases (increases, and therefore 
domestic input used increases [decreases]) i.f.f. the relative frequency of occurrence between 
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risks coming with input imported and risks coming with final good imported is higher (lower) 
than the relative change in final good imported  and the total input consumed. 
Proof: These inequalities are obtained by using 1, 0, NIFG IFGt tθ γ< > <  and by comparing directly 
,
ee eeD I  with ,e eD I , respectively. 
(i) ee eFG FG> , ee eDFG DFG< , ee eIFG IFG> ; and 
(ii) ee eDI DI< , ee eI I<
>
 (and therefore ee eD D>
<
) i.f.f. 
ee e
I
e ee
IFG
z IFG IFG
z DI DI
> −
< −
. ▄ 
Part (ii) of lemma 2 states a relationship between prices, demand and cost parameters, 
and frequency of IS occurrence for the imported input to decrease (or increase). 
We are interested in a win-win situation, which is a sufficient condition for welfare 
improvement since IS risk decreases with a reduction of tariff escalation. Since a reduction in 
tariff escalation has ambiguous impacts on changes in the distribution of imported inputs and 
domestic input use, we focus on sufficient conditions that guarantee that the externality from IS 
is not exacerbated by the reform but rather reduced.  
Welfare in the input market is the producer surplus for D subtracted by the deadweight 
loss associated with the DI demand and the transferable surplus associated with the derived 
demand DI. The latter is already accounted for in the producer surplus for DFG. Hence, welfare 
is 
1
0.5 ( , )Iee ee ee ee d eeDI I I IFG IFGW D z I z IFG DI d DI
τ
τ τ τ τ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= − − − −⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫  
= ( )1/(1 ) /( 1) 1/( 1)1 10.5 IFGee ee ee NI I IFG I ID z I z IFG K θ θ θ θθτ θτ τ τθ θ
−
− −
−⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤
− − − − +⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ . (22) 
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Proposition 3: Under assumptions of sections 3.1. and 3.3., reducing tariff escalation by 
reducing the tariff on the imported final good and keeping the tariff on imported raw input 
constant increases total welfare and reduces IS risks if 
ee e
I
e ee
IFG
z IFG IFG
z DI DI
−
>
−
.  
Proofs:
 
By lemma 2(ii), 
ee e
I
e ee
IFG
z IFG IFG
z DI DI
−
>
−
 means that ee eI I<  and ee eD D> .  
Moreover, given that ee eI I< , we have 
 
.
ee e ee e
e ee e ee
IFG IFG IFG IFG
DI DI I I
− −
>
− −
  Hence 
ee e
I
e ee
IFG
z IFG IFG
z I I
−
>
−
, or ee ee e eI IFG I IFGz I z IFG z I z IFG+ < + . This proves that the IS reduce. It 
also proves, together with ee eD D> , that the D producer surplus increases: 
0.5 ( ) 0.5 ( ) .ee ee ee e e eI I IFG I I IFGD z I z IFG D z I z IFGτ τ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− + > − +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
Comparing deadweight loss associated with demand of DI, since 
IFG IFG
Nτ τ<  and 1θ < , we get 
that d dee eDI DIDWL DWL< . We also know that welfare in the final good market only, which is the 
sum of consumer surplus, producer surplus, and tariff revenue, increases as the tariff on the final 
good falls. Therefore, total welfare, which is the sum of welfare in the final-good and input 
markets, increases after reforms. ▄ 
To express the local inequality I
IFG
z dIFG
z dDI
> −  in terms of underlying parameters, we first 
take the log differential of IFG and DI with respect to the natural logarithm of the tariff factor 
τIFG, which leads to  
ln /(1 )
ln 1
DFG
DFG
IFG
sd IFG
s
d
θ γ
τ θ
⎡ ⎤
= − + −⎢ ⎥
−⎣ ⎦  and 
ln 1
ln 1IFG
d DI
d τ θ
=
−
. 
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These expressions are substituted into the local inequality to yield 
ln / ln
ln / ln
IFG
IFG
d IFG d IFG dIFG
d DI d DI dDI
τ
τ
− = − ,  
therefore 
ln / ln
,
ln / ln
IFG I
IFG IFG
d IFG d zIFG
d DI d DI z
τ
τ
− <  
which after simplification leads to  
(1 )1IFG I
I IFG DFG
z
z s
τ γ θ
τ θ
−
> + .  (23) 
This sufficient condition for welfare improvement is expressed locally in terms of 
underlying parameters, where (-γ) and (θ/(1-θ)) are the own-price elasticity of demand and 
domestic supply of the final good, and sDFG is the share of the final good consumption sourced 
domestically (DFG/FG). This local condition is intuitive. As demand elasticity gets smaller in 
absolute value (lower γ), the expansion of FG and IFG induced by the lower tariff is moderated. 
As parameter θ gets larger, the decrease of the derived demand for DI induced by the lower tariff 
gets larger in absolute value, and so does the decrease in I and its IS externality. A large share 
sDFG means that IFG is small relative to DFG and also that DI and I are large other things being 
equal. Hence, the contribution of IFG to the externality gets smaller relative to the contribution 
of I as the share sDFG gets larger. The larger the initial tariff escalation (τIFG /τI  large) and the 
higher the pest risk for the raw input relative to the processed final good (ZI/ZIFG large), the more 
likely it is that the condition will be satisfied and welfare will be improved by a decrease in tariff 
escalation. 
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Other extensions 
The argument of Costello and McAusland on ambiguous effects of unilateral trade liberalization 
could be the basis for relaxing the sufficient conditions underlying propositions 2 and 3. The 
basic argument is that the externality may not increase when imports increase because the higher 
IS risk is applied to a lower land base corresponding to a lower D. This argument could be 
applied in our context of tariff escalation. Sufficient conditions established in propositions 2 and 
3 could be relaxed somewhat to account for the decrease in D induced by a lower tariff on raw 
inputs. The potentially higher β is applied to a lower basis and may reduce the total externality if 
the decrease in D offsets the impact of higher raw imports on the externality. 
 Another extension would be to refine the modeling of the damage function from IS. In 
many cases the consequences of introductions go beyond an increase of the costs in agricultural 
input supply, and the welfare analysis should include an evaluation of environmental impacts. 
However it would only reinforce the case for reduction in tariff escalation, provided it does not 
result in an increase in raw product imports. 
 The analysis provided in this paper would also hold with some IS-related environmental 
policies initially in place as long as the policies are not optimal, that is, a cost in the production 
of D is not internalized. Parameter zI can be policy dependent and as long as it is not equal to 
zero, the cost is not fully internalized or the pest associated with imports is not fully eliminated.7 
 
4. Conclusions 
Our paper investigated the interface between trade and IS risk and the impact of tariff escalation 
in agricultural and food-processing markets on IS hazard and associated externalities. Tariff 
escalation in processed agro-forestry products increases the risk of IS by biasing trade flows 
                                                        
7
 Having zI =0 does not invalidate our results but makes them a mute point focusing exclusively on tariff escalation. 
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toward primary commodity flows and against processed-product trade. We show that reductions 
of tariff escalation by reduction of the tariff on processed goods increases allocative efficiency 
and reduces the IS externality, a win-win situation. This finding has obvious implications for 
many exporters of raw and processed commodities. For example, several countries that are 
members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are major exporters of 
forestry products, both raw and processed. A reduction in the tariff escalation faced by forestry 
exports from ASEAN countries would produce a global win-win outcome: both economic 
efficiency and environmental sustainability would be enhanced in all countries involved. This 
implication is particularly relevant in the context of sustainable trade. Reductions in tariff 
escalation as designed in our analysis ensure an expansion of value-added activities and exports 
by developing countries while mitigating environmental externalities directly associated with 
trade. 
It is well known that a first-best policy menu typically calls for free trade and an 
additional targeted policy instrument to address the IS externality. However, Margolis, Shogren, 
and Fischer recall that IS are “among a small group of market failures,” the source of which is 
trade itself, and that often in these cases, reducing trade is the solution closest to the source of the 
failure, unless it is possible to monitor the harmful activity itself and sort out harmful imports by 
inspection. In the absence of such an instrument or if such an instrument is not set optimally, we 
show that the tariff structure can be changed to ensure that allocative efficiency improves while 
keeping the IS risk in check or even reducing it. If the IS risk is contained to the raw input 
market, any reduction of the tariff on the final good leads to a desirable outcome. We also show 
that both tariffs can be decreased in an orderly fashion such that the risk of IS is not increased 
while deadweight loss in both markets can be reduced. Finally, we also show that if the 
23 
processed final good carries some moderate IS risk that is smaller than that of the raw input 
import, policy menus that reduce escalation and IS risk also exist but need to be designed to 
ensure that the IS risk is kept in check. In the latter, win-win situations are characterized by a 
price-elastic supply of the processed good, a price-inelastic demand for the processed good, a 
predominant domestic supply of the processed good, and a high initial tariff escalation.  
24 
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Figure 1a and 1b. Final good (1a) and input (1b) markets with IFGτ  reduced. 
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Figure 2a and 2b. Final good (2a) and input (2b) markets with both tariffs reduced. 
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Tariff escalation and IS hazard in the rice market  
The rice weevil (Sitophilus Oryzae) is a significant crop- and stored-grain destroyer. This pest 
originated in India and has been spread worldwide by commerce. In the southern United States, 
adult rice weevils fly from the stored grain to the crop in the field, which in turn goes into 
storage, continuing the infestation. They attack wheat, corn, oats, rye, barley, sorghum, 
buckwheat, dried beans, and cashew nuts. The most important aspect of control is location of the 
source of the infestation.  
Thailand is one of the largest rice growing countries in the world (annual production is 
19.5 million tons). The percentage of losses due to insect infestation is difficult to determine 
(there is no official report) and the figures vary from 1% to as much as 25%. The ASEAN stated 
that its member nations lost about 25% of their paddy crop during harvesting and other post-
harvest practices including storage and transportation. Presently, quantity loss is not as important 
a factor as the loss of goodwill in international trade. The loss of goodwill between traders and 
farmers, or between importers and exporters in the international markets, could be a serious 
matter in future marketing. In the past, major exporters experienced the embarrassment of some 
shipments being declared distressed cargoes. This was because of the presence of some banned 
insecticide on grain, which may cause health hazards to human beings. Commercial losses can 
also occur from the reduction of quality through adulteration or insect attacks (Sukprakarn). 
Recent entomologic studies have shown that rice processing practices, e.g., rice 
polishing, have a lethal effect on insects such as rice weevils (Lucas and Riudavets). This 
suggests that the risk of weevil invasions related to rice imports could be much lower for milled 
rice than for paddy imports. Indeed, an escalated tariff structure could result in increased 
environmental hazards of pest introduction. Note that for the considered case, phytosanitary 
barriers to trade might be ineffective since Rice weevil is not a quarantine insect. 
Wailes documents tariff escalation by milling stage in rice. Tariff escalation occurs in 
many nations that desire protection of their rice milling sectors. Tariffs that are higher on 
processed rice distort rice trade and milling activities. Tariff escalation is especially prevalent in 
Central and South American nations and the European Union. Under the Uruguay Round 
agreement, the EU agreed to convert variable levies to fixed tariffs and reduce them by 26% by 
2000. However escalation is still present. Tariffs on milled rice are higher than for brown or 
paddy rice. Current tariff levels are 211 euros per ton for paddy, 264 euros per ton for brown 
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rice, and 416 euros per ton for milled rice. Tariff escalation by degree of milling makes the tariff 
on milled rice prohibitive. Tariffs on milled rice imports into the EU are 80% compared to only 
46% for brown rice.  
In Mexico, paddy rice imports are assessed a 10% tariff while brown and milled have a 
20% tariff. The effect of tariff escalation is seen in the trade flows of milled high-quality long 
grain. Most of this trade goes to nations with low tariffs. Most of the trade in brown and paddy 
rice, however, goes to nations that have high tariffs on brown and paddy rice but even higher 
tariffs on milled rice. The trade-weighted average tariffs by degree of milling for high-quality, 
long grain rice is estimated to be 31.4% for brown and 16.9% for paddy rice. Table 1 
summarizes import protection on rice in countries exhibiting tariff escalation. 
 
Table A.1. Tariff protection in rice processing. 
  Long Grain   Medium/Short  
Country/Region  Milled  Brown Paddy Milled Brown 
 Non-fragrant Fragrant     
Brazil  15.0% 15.0% 13.0% 13.0% 15.0% 13.0% 
Costa Rica  35.0% 35.0% 35.0% 20.0% 35.0% 35.0% 
Côte d’Ivoire 32.0% 32.0% 12.0% 7.0% 32.0% 12.0% 
EU Union 80.0% 71.0% 46.0% 146.0% 75.0% 64.3% 
Mexico  20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 10.0% 20.0% 20.0% 
Other Europe 25.0% 25.0% 10.0% 10.0% 25.0% 10.0% 
Sierra Leone 32.0% 7.0% 12.0% 7.0% 32.0% 12.0% 
Taiwan 0.0% 210.0% 0.0% 0.0% 210.0% 229.4% 
Turkey 35.0% 27.0% 35.0% 27.0% 35.0% 35.0% 
US ($/ton) 14 14 21 18 14 21 
Sources: Wailes (2004) based on AMAD (Agricultural Market Access Database), USDA, FAS GAIN reports. 
 
Tariff escalation and IS hazard in wood-product markets  
The United States is the world’s largest importer of forest products. Wood imports have grown 
from less than 13% of volume consumed in 1965 to more than 25% of volume consumed in 1999 
(Howard). Wood is a plant material, whether in the form of logs, unfinished lumber, chips, 
shipping, or packing materials, and it has in it and on it larvae and adult wood-boring insects, 
fungi, and numerous other organisms from its native forest. Logs present the greatest risk of 
transporting pests. Among the major forest pests in the United States, introduced exotic species 
such as chestnut blight (Cryphonectria parasitica), Dutch elm disease (Ophiostoma ulmi), white 
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pine blister rust (Cronartium ribicola), the European gypsy moth (Lymantria dispar), the balsam 
woolly adelgid (Adelges piceae), the Formosan termite (Coptotermes formosanus), the pine 
shoot beetle (Tomicus piniperda), and the Asian longhorned beetle (Anoplophora glabripennis), 
have caused some of the most devastating losses in productivity and species displacement.  
The US is also an important producer both of raw wood and processed wood products. There are 
about 200 million hectares of commercial timberland in the United States. Dubensky et al. state 
that many forest industries are looking at ways to increase yields on less land. Invasive forest 
pests conveyed by large volumes of imported logs, chips, and other unprocessed wood products 
to manufacturing facilities in the United States could jeopardize this strategy.  
 Finish milling and kiln drying will kill wood organisms before they are imported if the 
procedures are done according to strict standards in the country of origin. While imports of 
lumber probably present a smaller risk than imports of logs, pests can still be transported by this 
pathway. Pests—especially fungi and nematodes—can travel in shipments of wood chips. While 
Canada is the principal and the safest source of foreign wood supplies (because its forests are 
contiguous with US forests and are unlikely to harbor insects and pathogens to which US forests 
are not adapted), other suppliers such as Chile and China are also increasing market penetration.8 
Unprocessed wood imported from all other temperate countries carries a significant risk of 
transporting pests that could threaten forests in the continental United States. If just 3% of logs 
imported from non-Canadian sources in 2000 harbored exotic pests, at least 1,941 pests would 
arrive in America through this pathway (Americanland.org). For example, Russian forest pests 
and pathogens that can be transported on logs and pose significant risks to North American 
forests include the Asian gypsy moth (Lymantria dispar), nun moth (Lymantria monacha), 
spruce bark beetle (Ips typographus), pine wood nematodes (Bursaphelenchus spp.), larch canker 
(Lachnellula willkommii), and root rot (Heterobasidion spp.). Takcz recalls that the potential 
economic costs associated with the introduction of these forest pests and pathogens from Russia 
are high (Table 2). “Costs would result from potentially reduced yields caused by growth loss, 
increased mortality, defects in the host species, and increased management costs. The 
introduction of these exotic pest organisms from Russia and their subsequent establishment in 
North American forests could result in significant changes in forest ecosystems, such as tree 
                                                        
8
 Softwood imports from countries other than Canada jumped by over 41%. 
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species conversion, deforestation, wildlife habitat destruction, degradation of riparian 
communities, increased fuel loading, and loss of biodiversity.” 
 
Table A.2. Potential economic losses from the introduction of selected Russian forest pests 
(US Department of Agriculture 1991). 
Pest Best Case Scenario  (x $1 million) 
Worst Case Scenario  
(x $1 million) 
Defoliators (Lymantria spp.) 35,049 58,410 
Nematodes (Bursaphelenchus spp.) 33 1,670 
Spruce beetle (Ips typographus) 210 1,500 
Root rot (Heterobasidion spp.) 84 344 
Larch canker (Lachnellula willkommii) 25 240 
 
Environmental activists complain that US timber companies and sawmills process foreign 
wood in the US to replace domestic logs they cannot obtain because of over-logging and export.  
The US Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) 
adopted phytosanitary regulations governing imports of wood,9 including logs, lumber, railroad 
ties, chips, and solid wood packing material, with a new standard for treating non-manufactured 
packing material as well. Wood packing material made entirely of processed manufactured wood 
(plywood, particle board, oriented strand board, veneer) is exempt from the standard. However 
these regulations have several limitations, both with the feasible enforcement issue and with the 
efficiency in reliably killing all pests. 
                                                        
9
 “APHIS” wood import regulation was based, in part, upon the results of risk assessments, careful analysis of 
available mitigation measures, consideration of comments from the public and industry, and the results of an 
environmental impact statement (EIS) that was completed in 1994 pursuant to the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA). The regulation became effective in August 1995 and was subsequently challenged by the Oregon 
Natural Resources Council (ONRC) and two California environmental groups (CATS) in federal court, in part, on 
grounds that the NEPA component of the rulemaking was deficient. The US District Court of Northern California 
agreed that the EIS was lacking in certain respects and, on June 5, 1997, enjoined the issuance of new import 
permits for the importation of certain unfinished nontropical wood articles under the 1995 regulation, pending the 
correction of deficiencies in the EIS. APHIS challenged the injunction and, in response, submitted a Supplemental 
EIS in May 1998. The judge ruled that the SEIS satisfied deficiencies in the original EIS and lifted the injunction on 
log import permits in January 1999. The plaintiffs appealed the ruling to the 9th Circuit Court, which recently 
upheld the earlier decision (USDA, APHIS 1998a).” From Dubensky et al., see http://www.apsnet.org/ 
online/exoticpest/Papers/dubensky.htm. 
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The Asian longhorned beetle (Anoplophora glabripennis) is a wood-boring insect with a 
lethal appetite for deciduous trees. It thrives inside hardwood trees such as maple, elm, locust, 
and horse chestnut. It came into New York and Chicago in the 1990s in wooden packing 
materials imported from China and has turned up at more than 30 locations around the United 
States—and has also been detected in Great Britain and recently in France. The beetles are 
virtually undetectable until they kill a tree from the inside and then fly on to the next one. The 
only known way to eradicate this pest is to cut every tree suspected of harboring it, chip all the 
wood, and burn all the chips.  
The government has felled and burned more than 10,000 trees so far in a still-
unsuccessful attempt to eliminate the beetle. Now the US Department of Agriculture (USDA 
APHIS) has proposed a $365 million plan to try to wipe out the beetle. Left unchecked, the 
beetle could destroy approximately one-third of all urban shade trees in the country over a couple 
of decades. The consequences of a wood-boring insect’s invasion could also be dramatic for the 
timber industry. In 1986, timber was the most important agricultural crop in the US in terms of 
dollar value of production, surpassing corn, soybeans, and hay. The APHIS estimates that if the 
Asian longhorned beetle were to expand beyond the current quarantined areas of New York, 
Illinois, and New Jersey, it could wreak havoc nationwide, affecting such industries as lumber, 
maple syrup, nurseries, and tourism and accumulating more than $41 billion in losses. 
Tariff escalation is predominant in wood products. Data for wood were obtained from the 
New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The technical data are shown in Table 3. 
The values are expressed in US dollars, but the same final outcome is valid for any other 
currency units. Let us look at the example of moldings in Table 3. Wood costs at $220 per cubic 
meter are the main costs, with energy etc (i.e., all non-labor costs of processing) at $21 and labor 
at $99 per cubic meter. This gives an end value of $340 per cubic meter for moldings, with added 
value past the log stage of $120. It is this $340 (plus freight difference, discussed below) that the 
final tariff is levied on, and not the value-added of $120.  
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Table A.3. Technical coefficients for wood processing (US$ per cubic meter). 
HS  Product Wood Energy Labor Added Final  
   Etc  Value Value  
4403 Logs*      
4407108 Clear wood 70 25 17 42 112  
440910 Moldings 220 21 99 120 340  
9403 Furniture 220 25 199 224 444  
440810 Veneers 300 22 202 224 524  
441219 Plywood 40 56 45 101 141  
44112/3 Fiberboard 20 76 15 91 111  
44103 Particleboard 10 61 38 99 109  
4701 Mechanical pulp 63 106 22 128 191  
Source: Jaakko Poyry Report.  
 
Logs are introduced into the table because they represent the raw material. Freight is 
another complicating factor. Logs are exported as a bulk commodity and as such face low per 
unit freight costs. Processed products require more sophisticated and therefore more costly 
handling than logs. An accurate assessment of the full impact of freight costs would require a 
detailed analysis of the differences in these costs by product to each individual market, whereas 
the costs in Table 3 are invariant as to destination. The freight costs will therefore increase the 
effective tariff rates (ETR), and the values seen below in Table 4 are an under-estimate. Tariffs 
for the main forestry products are shown in Table 4. These are the applied tariffs, and they are 
sourced from the relevant country’s tariff schedules. 
  
Table A.4. Applied tariff rates (ad valorem). 
 Korea US China Japan Malay Indon Phil Thai  
Product         
Logs 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 10  
Clear wood 5 0 0 4.8 0 0 10 10  
Moldings 8 0.3 9.4 5 20 0 7 20  
Furniture 8 0.5 11 0 30 15 20 20  
Veneers 5 0 4 5 20 5 10 20  
Plywood 8 10.4 8.4 15 35 15 20 20  
Fiberboard 8 6 7.5 2.6 20 5 20 20  
Particleboard 8 8 9.6 5 20 5 20 20  
Mechan pulp 0 0 0 0 0 5 3 5  
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 Table 5 combines Tables A.3 and A.4 to produce the ETR for the main forestry products. 
Some of these ASEAN countries are major exporters of forestry products. A reduction in the 
ETRs for forestry exports to ASEAN would produce a global win-win outcome: both economic 
efficiency and environment sustainability would be enhanced. 
 
Table A.5. Effective tariff rates (ETR), ad valorem or percentage rates. 
 Korea US China Japan Malay Indon Phil Thai  
Product         
Clear wood 10.0 0 0 12.8 0 0 26.7 10.0  
Moldings 19.0 0.85 26.6 14.2 56.7 0 19.8 38.3  
Furniture 13.9 1.0 21.8 0 59.5 29.7 39.6 29.8  
Veneers 9.0 0 9.4 11.7 46.8 11.7 23.4 33.4  
Plywood 10.4 14.5 11.7 20.9 48.9 20.9 27.9 24.0  
Fiberboard 9.3 7.3 9.2 3.2 24.4 6.1 24.5 22.2  
Particleboard 8.6 8.8 10.6 5.5 22.0 5.5 22.0 21.0  
Mechan pulp -2.0 0 0 0 0 7.5 4.5 2.5 
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